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make any award of 
is tantamount to dismissal of 
with respect to 
Judgments-Res Judicata-Dismissal.--When decision on 
dictional is based on determination of merits of an 
issue before it eonstitutes a determination of 
that issue. 
[5] Marriage~Incidents of Void and Voidable 
erty Rights.-Pact that man and woman do not in 
belil,ve are married does not court 
tecting their respective interests in 
[ 6] Id.- Annulment- Decree- Conclusiveness.-Regardless of 
whether or not husband in annulment action to establish 
his interest in jointly acquired property on of claim to 
one-half int<·rest therein without to 
marital relationship, his subsequent action to establish his 
interest on that theory is barred by adjudication in annulment 
motion awarding annulment to wife and to make 
of property on ground that 
Rights and remedies in respect of 
man and woman living together in illicit relations or under 
void marriage, note, 31 A.L.R.2d 1255. See also Cal.Jur., Mar-
§ 21; Am.Jur., Marriage, § 50 et seq. 
See Cal.Jur., § 185; Am.Jur., 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 6] Marriage, § 44; 
§ 22; [4] Judgments, § 353(1); [7] Judgments, Judg-
ments, §§ 395, 396. 
Court of Kern 
establish title to undivided one-half interest 
of 
reversed. 
Siemon & >::ilC:UlO>n and Alfred Siemon for 
Kendall & Howell and William A. Howell for Respondent. 
J.-Archie B. Shore to 
establish his title to 
real and in the of defendant 
Alberta l\Iae Shore and to secure a partition of the personal 
'l'he actions were consolidated for trial. In her 
answers, Alberta that Archie's actions were barred 
a decree of annulment between the and that Archie 
had given her his one-half interest in the while 
were as husband and wife. 'l'itle to all 
of the property had been taken the parties as 
joint tenants. The trial court found that the annulment 
decree was not a bar to these actions and that Archie had 
not made a of his interest in the to Alberta. 
It further found that Archie had deeded his interest in 
the real property to defendant to his interest from 
unfounded claims him third and that 
Alberta held Archie's interest on an oral trust for him. 
Since a confidential relationship had existed between the 
parties and since the claims against Archie were unfounded, 
it concluded that the oral trust ·was enforceable and entered 
an annulment 
another spouse 
to Alberta. It 
delicto, and "that the 
concerning the character of the yyr.m"'""'" 
cause of action of 
of law it stated "That the 
fault in the 
c1iction to make any award of 
mnnity in character." 
Alberta contends that the finding and conclu-
sion constitute a binding adjudication that at the time of 
the annulment neither was entitled to relief 
the other with to the here in question. 
the other hand, that a denial of relief 
for does not constitute a judgment on 
the merits and that in any event no with re-
[2] 
to the was carried into decree 
are properly 
an annulment the 
211 Cal. 
183 CaL 335, 
v. San-
A.L.R. 342].) 
was not entered into in 
uv•c·"·''v"' that because the parties were in 
of them was entitled to legal assistance with 1'"'"""'"'. 
when the decree of annul-
the light of the findings of fact and 
Vernon v. Superior Court, 
; Gelfand v. O'Haver, 
P.2d 790]), it is clear that it was 
tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the 
parties with to their property interests. The situa-
tion is thus analogous to that in Olwell v. Hopkins, 
28 Oal.2d 147 [168 P.2d 972], where it was held that a 
of dismissal was res judicata when it appeared 
that the dismissal was based upon a determination that the 
contract sued upon was void. The court recognized that 
'' a of dismissal is not a judgment on 
the merits and therefore does not operate as a bar to another 
action on the same cause of action. This court has recog-
nized, however, that a dismissal may follow an actual deter-
mination on the merits [citations] as have courts in other 
... At the upon their motion to dis-
miss the defendants introduced in evidence 
the record of the first action. It is clear from that record 
that the one issue passed upon by the trial court in dismissing 
the first aetion was that raised by defendants' eontention 
that cause of action was based upon a contract 
that was void. The defense thus interposed went to the 
merits ' eause of action. . . . [Defendants] raiRed 
.,,,..,hrh'' right to recover under any eir-
eumstanccs upon their alleged eause of aetion and upon 
that issue the court rendered judgment against plaintiffs.'' 




He relies on evidence with respect 
to the of the property and the dealings 
therewith that the trial court found to be sufficient to estab-
elaim to a one-half interest without reference to 
[5] As was pointed out in VaUera v. 
sttpra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 685, the fact that a man and 
woman do not in good faith believe are married does 
not the court from protecting their in-
terests in jointly acquired property. Accordingly if Archie 
advanced the theory of recovery he now relies upon in the 
annulment action, the court erred in holding that the fact 
the parties were in pari delicto prevented relief. [6] Al-
it does not appear that Archie sought to establish 
his interest in the property in the annulment action on the 
now whether he did or these actions 
are barred by that adjudication. He now seeks to establish 
the same in the property that he sought to establish 
in the annulment action, and the decision in that action 
went to the merits of his claim. If the court in the 
annulment action applied the doctrine of pari 
delicto to deny relief on the theory now advanced, Archie's 
PaT1'"'""' was by appeal. On the other hand, if Archie failed 
to present the present theory of recovery in the former 
it is too late for him to do so now. The situation 
indistinguishable from that in Krier v. Krier, 28 
841 P.2d 681], where a wife in succes-
sive actions to establish an interest in the same property on 
different legal theories. ''In the prior maintenance 
action J\Irs. Krier and an with 
to her interest in the property. She here seeks a 
second adjudication relative to her interest in the same 
property. [7] It is settled, however, that a judgment in 
a prior action between the same parties on the identical 
682 SHORE C.2d 
and a bar to a second suit 
actually determined therei11 
but also as to issues involved. 
[8] And even the cause of action be different, the 
determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent 
suit between the as to that issue and every 
matter which to sustain or defeat its 
determination. 
'' claimed the property in the prior action solely 
as community property and having procured a decree 
therein based on its character as such, Mrs. Krier is pre-
cluded from seeking in this later action another award 
thereof based on an entirely different interest (homestead 
or otherwise) existing, but unclaimed, at the time of the 
earlier adjudication. Under the circumstances she was re-
quired to advance her entire interest, whether community 
or homestead, or both, in order to permit the court to make 
an effective and complete adjudication of the respective 
interests of the parties. [Citation.] Not having done so, 
she cannot relitigate the matter, whether it be held that the 
two suits involved the same cause of action insofar as they 
concerned her interest in the property, or merely involved 
a common issue as to her interest in the property." (28 
Cal.2d at 843-844.) 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I do not agree that the finding of the trial court in the 
annulment action brought by Alberta to the effect that "the 
Court, therefore, makes no findings concerning the character 
of the property set out in the first cause of action of [Al-
berta's] complaint" and the conclusion of law that "the 
Court, finding both parties at fault in the purported mar-
riage, declines for lack of jurisdiction to make any award 
of property alleged to be community in character,'' con-
stituted a binding determination of the property issue so as 
to constitute a bar to the present actions. It was, in my 
opinion, a specific declaration that the issue had not been 
adjudicated. 
''There can be no doubt that the dismissal of an action 
or denial of relief for want of jurisdiction is not a judgment 
on the merits, and cannot prevent the plaintiff from sub-
SHORE v. 
[43 C.2d 677; 277 P.2d 4] 
his action in any 
and determine it. No 
uuLu'"'S or as to the matters ~·,_~,..~~ 
. Refusal to pass on a 
is not an 
on vol. 2, p. 
lll cOorrnick-Saeltzer Oo., 179 Cal. 
court said : ' to the 
683 
closure suit, it is very plain that the court did not therein 
undertake to pass upon the merits of the controversy between 
Slaker and the McCormick-Saeltzer Company. What it did 
u'as to decline to deterrnine that controversy, the reason 
that it tiJas without jttrisdiction, in that action, so to do. 
Whether the holding that it had no jurisdiction was sottnd 
or erroneous is not a question for consideration here. The 
essential point is that there was no adjudication of the 
merits. . . . " (Emphasis added.) It is elemental that a 
judgment which has not been rendered on the merits is not 
res judicata (Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515 [269 
P. 433] ; Goddar·d v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 
Cal.2d 47, 52 [92 P.2d 804]; Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 
16 Cal.2d 169, 173 [105 P.2d 118]; Everts v. Blaschko, 17 
Cal.App.2d 188 [61 P.2d 776] ; Matteson v. Klump, 100 Cal. 
App. 64 [279 P. 669]; Helvey v. 73 Cal.App.2d 667 
[167 P.2d 492]; Jacobs v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 
4 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 40 P.2d 899] ; Miller v. Ambassador Park 
Syndicate, 121 Cal.App. 92 [9 P.2d 267]; Taylor v. Darling, 
22 Cal.App. 101 [133 P. 503]; Security T. & S. Bank v. 
8o1lihern Pac. Co., 214 Cal. 81 P.2d 1015] ; Scheeline v. 
111 ashier, 172 Cal. 565 [158 P. 222]). 
What the majority is saying is, in effect, this: When the 
trial court determined it had no jurisdiction to decide the 
question of property, it was really a determination on the 
merits that neither party was entitled to relief and therefore 
''tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the 
parties with respect to their property interests." The trial 
court specifically made no finding as to the character of the 
property. As in the Slaker case, it to determine 
the for the reason that it felt it was without 
jurisdiction. "Whether the holding that it had no jurisdic-
tion was sound or erroneous is not a question for consideration 
here, The essential point is that there was no adjudication 
was 
·if Archie 
of recovet'Y in the former 
it is too late for him to do so now.'' The rule set forth m 
Krier v. 28 Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d , is not applicable 
here. 'When a court specifically declines to pass upon an 
the rule as to issues involved directly, or involved 
implication, does not apply. 
Before the trial court could reach any conclusion with rc-
to the property interests involved, it had 
first to determine the character of the property. This it did 
not do. That no determination was in fact made is borne 
out by the language used in the conclusion of law wherein 
comment is made concerning the ''alleged'' community char-
acter of the . As we said in Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 
840. 843 P.2d 390], "While it is true that as a 
is a bar as res judicata not only as 
action on the same matter actually determined, 
all issues that might have been litigated as 
incident to or connected with the subject matter 
of the litigation and every matter coming within its legitimate 
purview (Code Civ. Proc., 1908, 1911; 15 Cal.Jnr. 142 
, it is also true that that is adjudged in a former 
judgment ~ovhich appears upon its face to have been adjudged 
or which was actually and necessarily included therein or 
necessary thereto. Civ. Proc., § 1911.) And when it 
appears that an issue was not determined by 
it is not res j1tdicata upon that issue. 
·is not an adjudication as to matters which the 
court 
18 Cal.2d 302 [115 P.2d 478] 
CW atson v. Poore, 
15 Cal.Jur. 150.)" (Emphasis 
added.) 
If we were not faced with the that no de-
termination was made as to the character of the property, 
the position taken in the majority opinion might be entitled 
685 
1s view that the 
fliet with the rule set forth in F'reeman on 
Blaker v. McCormick-SaeUzer supra, as well as 
Stark v. sttpra. 'rhe rule announced in the majority 
opinion extends the doctrine of res judicata beyond its in-
tended scope in that a of this court there concludes, 
the face of a clear statement the trial court to the 
that an issue was finally determined so as to con-
stitute a bar to a second action. The result of the 
conclusion reached the is to the 
n such an action of his 
I would affirm the 
concurred. 
Hespondeut's petition for a was denied De-
cember 29, 1954. Shenk, J., Carter, and Schauer, were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
